Brazil’s Agricultural Subsidies

Ang Brazil ay itinuturing na isang umuunlad na bansa, ngunit naging isang kapangyarihang pang-ekonomiya bilang isang pangunahing tagaluwas at agri-pagkain na pinag-uusapan ngayon 28 percent of GDP. Brazil’s Ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevedo, is one of two candidates to become Director General of the WTO. The Brazilian government’s recent notification to the WTO of agricultural subsidies for the 2009/10 crop year has raised issues about Brazil’s positions on trade-distorting domestic support policies.

Ang kabuuang suporta sa bukid ng gobyerno ng Brazil na tinukoy ng WTO ay pinahalagahan $10.0 billion for 2009/10. Almost half of that, $4.91 bilyon, was in the ‘green box’ considered to be minimally trade distorting and not subject to limits. The largest category was domestic food aid at $1.72 bilyon. That is typical of many countries, kasama na ang U.S. Government holding of food stocks for food security purposes was reported at $653 milyon. This included $386 million ‘for acquisition of agricultural products from family farming’. There is a proposal at the WTO to greatly expand this category for developing countries. Other major categories in the green box were extension and advisory services at $800 milyon, infrastructure at $622 milyon, agrarian reform at $430 million and research at $285 milyon.

As a developing country, Brazil can have some development programs under ‘special and differential treatment’ that are also exempt from limits. These programs totaled $1.65 bilyon, most of which was for investment in improving rural structure, acquiring equipment and machinery and animal services at $1.44 bilyon. Other programs included production credit for low-income or resource-poor farmers, pag-iskedyul muli ng utang at mga subsidyong pang-input.

Nagkaroon ng Brazil $3.48 bilyun-bilyong Mga Pagsasama-sama na Mga Sukat ng Suporta (AMS) sa 2009/10 in domestic support that was classified in the ‘amber box’ as trade-distorting subsidies that must be limited and reduced over time. Non-product specific AMS totaled $2.53 bilyon. Debt rescheduling programs accounted for $1.53 bilyon ng kabuuang AMS at ang produksyon at kredito sa marketing ay isa pa $822 million in AMS. The remaining $176 million was for direct outlays for a risk minimizing agribusiness program. Non-product specific support is considered ‘de minimis’ for developing countries if it is less than 10 percent of the total value of production. Non-specific product support was only 2.47 percent of total value of production of $102 bilyon.

The remaining amber box AMS was in $950 million of product-specific domestic support. Corn had the highest AMS at $293 milyon, followed by cotton at $269 milyon, coffee $137 milyon, kanin $126 milyon, trigo $75 milyon, tubo $24 million and edible beans $23 milyon. Developing countries are allowed product-specific AMS up to 10 percent of the value of production of the product before the AMS is considered beyond the de minimis and reportable to the WTO. Cotton was the only crop beyond the limit at 11.5 percent of value of production and its AMS value of $269 million was the only AMS subject to the amber box AMS ceiling of $912 million for trade-distorting domestic support. Sugar’s AMS of $24 million for a production cost equalization program, is an insignificant 0.15 percent of a crop value at $16.0 bilyon.

Brazil reporting a low total AMS for 2009/10 was no great surprise because market prices have been relatively high since 2008. Those high prices reduce payments for crops with minimum price guarantees and the high value of the crop makes payments low as a percent of total value. Gayundin, Ang Brazil ay mayroong 10 porsyento ng pagpapalit ng halaga de minimis kumpara sa a 5 porsyento ng limitasyon para sa mga maunlad na bansa.

Ayon sa mga ulat mula sa U.S. Mga Attact ng Pang-agrikultura sa Brazil, there are three main ongoing payment programs. The Subsidy Auction Program (PEP) ay katulad ng U.S. programa sa pagbabayad ng kakulangan sa utang. The government pays the difference between the prevailing market price and the minimum price of the product. Payments were made for edible beans, mais at trigo sa 2009/10.

Ang Equalization Premium Bayad sa Producer (PEPRO) ay isang premium na ipinagkaloob sa magsasaka o kooperatiba na nagbebenta ng mga produkto nito sa pampublikong auction, where the government pays the difference between the reference value established by the government and the value of the premium. All the cotton payments in 2009/10, $269 milyon, were made under this program. Corn payments under the program were $38 milyon.

Ang Risk Premium para sa Pribadong Opsyon (PANUKALA) ay isang programa ng suporta sa presyo na pinamamahalaan ng CONAB, katumbas ng Commodity Credit Corporation ng USDA, which is linked to the Ministry of Agriculture. It represents the maximum amount that CONAB will pay to cooperatives and processors in order to guarantee a certain price to producers, which is above the market price. tungkol sa 15 porsyento ng mga soybeans na ginawa sa 2006 at 2007 kung saan kasangkot sa isa sa mga programa, ngunit ang mga gumagawa ng soybean ay hindi nakatanggap ng mga pagbabayad mula noon.

Habang derekta ang pagbabayad ng gobyerno, maliban sa koton, ay medyo maliit o wala sa 2009/10 at mula noon, that does not mean that farmers are just relying on market conditions. Brazil has had a continuing problem of farmers with heavy debt loads from past years of borrowing to rapidly expand production and low incomes due to weather conditions. Low-cost government lending and debt rescheduling shown with an AMS of $1.53 bilyon sa 2009/10 nakakaapekto sa bawat ani, including sugar and soybeans. The Brazilian government of President Dilma Rouseff is expected to announce later this month a government credit program for 2013/14 na may mga subsidized na rate ng interes ng 2.5 porsiyento, pababa mula sa 5.5 porsyento ngayong taon, and larger than this year’s program of $58 bilyon.

ang 2009/10 ang kabuuang AMS na napapailalim sa kisame ng amber box para sa Brazil ay hindi isang magandang pahiwatig ng kung ano ang maaaring maging AMS sa hinaharap, tulad din ng U.S. or any other country that has relatively low price and income guarantees at a time of high market prices. Lower prices will occur, at ang pamahalaang Brazil ay nagpakita sa 2006 at 2007 that they have the programs in place to buffer the adjustments that need to occur. Brazil could very quickly develop AMS limit problems.

Si Ross Korves ay isang Trade and Economic Policy Analyst na may Truth About Trade & teknolohiya (www.truthabouttrade.org). Sundan mo kami: @TruthAboutTrade sa Twitter | Katotohanan Tungkol sa Kalakal & Teknolohiya sa Facebook.