Com parlar augments reiniciar les negociacions polítiques de Doha rodó de la OMC comercials, more analyses about subsidies in developing countries are being released. A recent analysis by DBT Associates, LLC descriu el gran buit entre els compromisos assumits per l'Índia, Xina, Brasil, Acord sobre l'agricultura al voltant de Tailàndia i Turquia a l'Uruguai (URAA) i outlays del programa present.

Quan el URAA es negocià a principis de 1990 hi havia una gran frustració que els països desenvolupats, inclosos els EUA, were using various agricultural subsidies to capture export markets that would possibly be served by developing countries in a more market-driven environment. Developed countries and developing ones were assigned spending limits for trade-distorting domestic agricultural subsidies in relation to historical outlays to begin reducing them. The Doha Round was to make further outlay reductions. The focus was on reducing subsidies that existed in 1995 and not letting new ones be instituted. Subsidies for a crop that are less than 5 per cent del valor de mercat als països desenvolupats i 10 per cent per als països en vies de desenvolupament van ser considerats de minimis (petit) i ignorat a efectes de càlcul de subvenció.

El que no s'esperava era que alguns països en desenvolupament importants fortament augmentaria outlays com a terra de les negociacions per aturar, while developed countries limited outlays to meet their WTO commitments to reduce subsidies impacting export markets. The DBT analysis looks at recent years for wheat, corn and rice. The subsidies impacts on markets are measured in a technical term called the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). India and Turkey were each assigned an AMS of zero because they did not use subsidies or they were less than 10.0 percent of market value for each of the three crops in the base years of 1986-88. China was also assigned a zero limit when it joined the WTO in 2001. Brazil was assigned an AMS of $0.912 milions i Tailàndia $0.634 milions de dòlars.

DBT estimated the countries actual AMS for recent years. L'Índia, Xina i Turquia, que tenia per límits de AMS any de $0.0 per a les tres collites, havia estimat AMS anuals, respectivament, de $26.1-93.4 milions de dòlars, $48.4-109.8 milions i $7.0 milions de dòlars. Brasil, amb un límit de $0.912 milions de dòlars l'any, tenia un pressupost dels darrers anys: $1.4 milions de dòlars. That does not include Brazil’s big field crops of soybeans and sugar. Thailand had an estimated AMS of $1.9-10.6 milions de dòlars per comparació amb un límit de $0.634 milions de dòlars. The numbers for India and China are truly incredible. These are not cases of accidental overruns, Gestió però deliberada de programes sense consideració per compromisos WTO.

En mirar alguns detalls sobre programes de cada país, India is a good one to start with because they run relatively simple programs. The central government sets a minimum support price (MSP) que encoratja als agricultors a produir grans conreus i compra grans quantitats (sobre 30 per cent de la collita en els darrers anys) of wheat and rice to maintain those market prices. Corn is a relatively minor crop. The MSP for 2013/14 per blat era $232 per MT, arròs $332 per MT i blat de moro $217 per MT. Per a la comparació, preus de suport en l'u. 2014 projecte de llei agrícola són $201 per MT de blat, $308 per MT per l'arròs i $146 per MT for corn. Much of what the government buys is sold to low-income people at subsidized prices. When excess supplies accumulate, they are sold at world market clearing prices. Last year wheat was sold with a subsidy estimated at $27-38 per MT. En 2013 L'Índia era el major exportador de arròs del món a 10 MT. Last year India tied up the WTO policy implementing process for six months to get assurance they could continue these programs.

India also subsidizes inputs. In the latest year India reported to the WTO, 2008/09, que va passar $33 mil milions en subsidis, però només va informar 20 percent of that in the most trade distorting category. Their de minimis limit is $23.5 milions de dòlars. The DBT authors believe the entire amount should be in the most trade distorting category.

Les polítiques de la Xina són com de l'Índia amb preus més alts de suport i programes addicionals, including direct payments to grain producers. Its market support prices in 2013/14 van ser $384 per MT de blat, $438 per MT per l'arròs i $361 per MT for corn. They mostly affect international markets by keeping out lower-priced commodities, although they do export small quantities of all three grains. The DBT authors cite the refusal to import U.S. blat de moro en 2014 més preocupació sobre el blat de moro biotec MIR 162 as an example of keeping out lower-priced products. China also has input subsidies for fuel, fertilitzants i altres insums que estan inclosos en l'AMS.

Brasil també utilitza mínim garantit els preus (MGP) as a foundation for its income support policies. It uses other programs to move products to grain deficit areas or to export and to support incomes at the MGP price level. The costs of the export subsidies for corn are included in the AMS estimate. It seems that most government programs have an export subsidy component.

The Thailand government operated a Paddy Pledging Scheme for rice under which it purchased rice from producers at a support price far above world market rates. That resulted in a loss of exports to countries like India and a huge accumulation of stocks. The new government replaced it with subsidize credit and direct payment. Then they brought back the pledging program. The new program is a smaller version of the old program and depending on how it operates will cause WTO AMS limit problem.

Turquia té alts preus suports, fa directa pagaments, Subvenciona aportacions, té un Consell de gra que fa compres dels agricultors i ha subsidis a les exportacions de blat i farina. Turquia és un dels exportadors més gran del món de farina de blat.

Regles WTO no han impedit que els països en desenvolupament de seguint els mals hàbits dels països desenvolupats a tenir subvencions que distorsionen el comerç. Davant aquesta realitat, el debat de política tot comerç per l'agricultura necessiti ser repensat.

Ross Korves és un comerç i analista de política econòmica de veritat sobre comerç & Tecnologia (www.truthabouttrade.org/). Segueix-nos: @TruthAboutTrade i @World_Farmers a Twitter | Veritat sobre comerç & Tecnologia en Facebook.