El brasiler i u. els governs han estat en desacord sobre EUA. cotó intern i exportació polítiques a l'OMC de crèdit durant els darrers dotze anys. They now have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that is much different from what either expected at the beginning. Trading relationships have changed over time making these policies much less meaningful than twelve years ago.

En 2002, Brasil va desafiar u. programes de recolzament interior de cotó i exportació garanties de crèdit a l'OMC com incompatible amb l'u. WTO policy commitments. A WTO Dispute Resolution Panel ruled in 2004 that the programs as operated then were not proper under the WTO agreement. L'u. appealed the ruling and the Appellate Body upheld the ruling in 2005. A l'agost 2009, Àrbitres WTO va decidir que podria imposar Brasil $830 milions anuals en sancions contra u. comerç, including on intellectual property rights. The two countries have spent the last five years working out an arrangement to avoid the imposition of additional tariffs on products exported from the U.S. al Brasil.

Govern del Brasil, publicat per primera vegada una llarga llista d'u. contra el qual es podria venjar-se de béns, including the potential cross-retaliation on intellectual property rights. L'u. i Brasil colpejat un acord marc temporal en 2010 per a l'u. de pagar l'Institut Brasiler de cotó $12.3 million per month for industry research and development until a new farm bill could be passed that modificat els programes. Representatives of the two governments also met quarterly to discuss provisions that could be in the new farm bill. The farm bill was a year and a half late before being passed by Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture ran out of money to pay the Brazilians in September 2013, però el marc va romandre en el lloc i expirat el febrer 7, 2014, Quan la 2014 projecte de llei agrícola va ser promulgada.

Perquè l'u. va ser el partit perdent l'original 2004 decisió, l'u. had the responsibility to seek a resolution of the dispute or face retaliation by Brazil as allowed by the WTO. The facts of the case were no longer an issue; both countries only needed to agree on a solution to the ruling. But the Brazilian government was far from united on how to respond. A cap sorpresa, the cotton growers had pushed for retaliation. Brazil’s foreign ministry and the country’s large businesses urged caution. They thought that enacting protectionist measures would hurt Brazil’s sluggish economy. Supply lines are more likely today to cross international borders than in the past and increasing import tariffs would have hurt Brazilian manufacturers and consumers. One observer noted that the agreement decouples trade opportunities from policy disagreements when both sides in a dispute are major trading partners.

Sota l'assentament, l'Institut Brasiler de cotó immediatament rebrà $300 milions dels EUA. and be allowed to use the money on an expanded list of activities. L'u. no canviarà l'actual programa per a u. cotó productors per la vida de la 2014 projecte de llei agrícola. L'u. també canviarà el programa mercaderia exportació préstec GSM-102 a limitar la durada dels préstecs a 18 mesos i enllaçar-los a taxes d'interès fixat per l'organització de cooperació i desenvolupament econòmic (L'OCDE) Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. Loans for 12 mesos fins a 18 mesos es valorarà a 90 percent of the OECD rate risk adjusted by country by USDA. Loans of 18 mes es valorarà a 95 per cent de la taxa ajustada de risc.

L'u. gets much in return. Brazil will drop its pending litigation at the World Trade Organization by October 22 i renunciar al seu dret a $830 million per year in retaliatory measures authorized by the WTO in 2009. Brazil agreed it will not launch new complaints (una clàusula de"Pau") en l'actual cotó subvenció programa tan llarg com l'actual u. projecte de llei agrícola està en vigor (fins al setembre 2018) i l'u. compleix les condicions de l'acord bilateral amb Brasil. També, hi haurà cap queixa contra garanties de crèdit agrícola exportació sota el programa GSM-102 si és coherent amb els termes acordats.

Productors de cotó brasiler ara semblen estar disposats a viure amb STAX, un programa d'assegurances de cultiu per als productors de cotó amb un 80 percentatge subvenció pel govern federal, even though it is still skeptical about the program’s impact on Brazilian producers and plans to monitor the effects. The Brazilian Cotton Association had earlier said their analysis indicated STAX would provide more subsidies than the previous programs.

El MOU és criticat per últim a través de set. 30, 2018, amb dues excepcions. The first is that the provisions on GSM-102 export loans will stay in place as long as the U.S. continues to operate the program in accordance with the MOU. The second is that the provisions outlining the uses of funds by the Brazil Cotton Institute will be enforced until projects are completed and no funds remain available for allocation by the institute.

La disputa 12 anys va canviar u. policies for cotton and the export credit program. Cotton is no longer a farm program crop like corn, blat, soja, rice and peanuts. Cotton producers cannot receive payments under the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) because cotton does not have a fixed reference price like the other crops. The length of commodity export loans has been cut from 36 mesos a 18 mesos. Interest rates are rated by the default risk of the country covered and a higher percentage of the total program costs are paid by the program’s users.

L'u. programa de cotó continuarà essent un problema, però no tant, a l'OMC. Exports have been about 75 per cent del totals usos dels EUA. cultiu recentment comparat amb 60 per cent en 2000-2002 i 28 per cent del comerç mundial recentment comparat amb 38 per cent en 2000-2002. U. domestic use declined with the ten-year phase out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement at the end of 2004. U. producció ha estat 15.6 milions de bales anualment de mitjana en els últims anys en comparació amb 18.2 milions bales anuals en 2000-2002. A bigger issue is that some of the poorer countries in the world are cotton producers who do not access to technology used by U.S., Brazilian and Chinese producers. Increased farm program spending by middle income developing countries (Brasil, L'Índia & Xina) també està rebent més atenció.

Ross Korves és un comerç i analista de política econòmica de veritat sobre comerç &Tecnologia (www.truthabouttrade.org). Segueix-nos: @TruthAboutTrade en Refilar |Veritat sobre comerç & Tecnologia en Facebook.