Ja que el govern de Tailàndia va decidir en 2011 el preu de l'arròs substancialment per sobre el mercat mundial de suport, it has had problems with slow exports and the accumulation of high levels of stocks. The government is now forced to sell stocks going out of condition to raise funds to cover more new crop rice offered to the program. This is a never ending cycle that cannot have a good ending and has failed in many developed countries.

Abans de la 2011/2012 any de comercialització, Tailàndia va ser exportador més gran del món de l'arròs al 9-10 tona mètrica milions (. MMT) l'any de l'arròs blanquejat, aproximadament la meitat de la seva producció anual de 20 . MMT i uns 25 per cent del comerç mundial de 36-38 . MMT. Total global rice trade is a relatively small part, sobre 8 per cent, of world production. The new Thai government had promised higher market prices during the 2011 elections and followed through with a program used in much of the world. Price support loans at above market prices are made to famers with grain as collateral, i forfeiture del gra al govern es produeix si els preus de mercat són inferiors al preu de préstec.

The program was implemented on the expectation that world market prices would increase to the Thai loan price in the relatively thinly traded market. That may have happened if India did not have a similar problem of accumulated rice stocks and exports under its high price support program. India increased exports from 2.2 . MMT a 2009/10 i 4.6 . MMT a 2010/11 a 10.3 . MMT a 2011/12, 9.7 . MMT a 2012/13 i projectada pel servei agrícoles estrangers (FAS) de l'USDA a 9.0 . MMT a 2013/14. Thai exports declined to 6.9 . MMT a 2011/12 i 7.0 . MMT a 2012/13 i es projecten per recuperar-se a 8.0 . MMT a 2013/14 com a govern inventaris es venen a preus reduïts.

Thai carryover stocks accumulated under the program as expected. FAS estimates they increased from 5-6 . MMT a finals de 2009/10 i 2010/11 a 9.3 . MMT per 2011/12, estima en 12.4 . MMT per 2012/13 i projectades al 15.5 . MMT per 2013/14. Stocks at the end of June were estimated by the U.S. Agrícola agregat a Tailàndia en 17-18 . MMT, almost equal to one year’s production. The Attaché believes that political issues are holding back additional export sales and putting more financial pressure on securing funds for new loans to farmers. Government officials usually resist selling stocks at a loss until stocks grow hopelessly large. Octubre 1 Normalment és l'Inici oficial de la temporada de pignoració d'arròs pel cultiu d'estiu grans.

Segons dades de preu compilats per FAS, the Thai government has spent the last year catching-up with market reality. In August of last year, Arròs de Tailàndia va ser un preu a prop de alta qualitat u. i arròs uruguaià a sobre $575 per MT. Indi, Arròs vietnamita i pakistanesos cotitzava a $425-475 per MT. In early August of this year, U. i arròs uruguaià havia traslladat fins a $625 per MT, però el preu de l'Arròs Thai havia caigut durant els quatre mesos anteriors a $500 per MT. Unfortunately for Thai exporters, preus de les altres tres principals exportadors eren sobre $415-435 per MT.

Arròs de preus d'intervenció per a la 2011/12 i 2012/13 els cultius es van $445-484 per MT. Given quality discounts and storage costs, rice is already being sold at a loss. The losses should increase in coming months as Thai prices need to decline further to meet the competitive prices of the other major exporters, which are expected to have steady to higher production compared to last year. The Thai government had recognized reality and proposed lowering by 20 Preu per cent la intervenció per a la 2013/14 retallar a $356-387 per MT. The government has reversed that decision, però baixa la quantitat que pot ser compromès per la granja a limitar els costos del programa.

These policy actions have caught the attention of other WTO members. At a WTO Agriculture Committee meeting last November the U.S. i Pakistan va demanar com el govern tailandès podria alliberar l'arròs per exportar sense subvencions quan pagaven 40 percent above market prices. Thailand has committed to the WTO to not use export subsidies. A una marxa 2013 Reunià de l'u. and others asked again about the export subsidy issues and if Thailand exceeded its limit on its domestic agricultural subsidies. The answers to those questions will become obvious in coming months unless market conditions change radically.

None of these outcomes should be a surprise to anyone with some understanding of the history of farm programs in developed and developing countries. The EU is famous for its ‘wine lakes’ and ‘butter mountain’ of the 1980s when price supports were held well above market clearing prices. L'u. government had so much grain in government controlled stocks that it gave grain to farmers who agreed to let land lay idle in 1983. That combined with a drought cut carryover stocks sharply, but no changes were made in price supports or stocks policies. Per 1985, carryover stocks were burdensome again. The Thai government probably had the best of intensions when it changed policies in 2011, però la història va predir el pitjor dels resultats, que es va convertir en realitat.

El comerç global d'arròs pot ser a per un altre xoc de subministrament de l'Índia, the largest rice exporter recently. India’s ruling party proposed and the lower house of Parliament has approved sweeping legislation guaranteeing subsidized grain, incloent-hi l'arròs, per gairebé 70% del país ’ s 1.2 mil milions de persones. The upper house of Parliament is expected to approve the measure, but the timeline for implementation is uncertain. The plan will undoubtedly reduce the amount of Indian rice accumulating in government warehouses in good crop years, i finalment disponible per a l'exportació, i a l'extrem pot eliminar les exportacions en anys de cultiu curt.

Rice importers are left to absorb the market adjustments. China is the largest net importer of about 3.0 MMT after years of being a net exporter and having balanced trade for a few years. The next largest importer is Nigeria at 2.4 . MMT, seguit d'Indonèsia a 1.5 . MMT. Many of the other buyers are developing countries importing to meet rising demand. There is not a close substitute for rice imports.

L'u. i altres països han preguntes dur a l'OMC de Tailàndia, India and other countries who have domestic support policies that by default drive export volumes. Importers need reliable suppliers meeting their long-term needs, no la incertesa dels proveïdors d'exportació accidental impulsada per les polítiques nacionals.

Ross Korves és un comerç i analista de política econòmica de veritat sobre comerç & Tecnologia (www.truthabouttrade.org). Segueix-nos: @TruthAboutTrade en Refilar | Veritat sobre comerç & Tecnologia en Facebook.