البرازيلي والولايات المتحدة. اختلفت الحكومات حول الولايات المتحدة. domestic cotton and export credit policies at the WTO for the last twelve years. They now have a Memorandum of Understanding (مذكرة تفاهم) that is much different from what either expected at the beginning. Trading relationships have changed over time making these policies much less meaningful than twelve years ago.

في 2002, تحدت البرازيل الولايات المتحدة. برامج الدعم المحلية للقطن وضمانات ائتمانات التصدير في منظمة التجارة العالمية باعتبارها غير متسقة مع الولايات المتحدة. WTO policy commitments. A WTO Dispute Resolution Panel ruled in 2004 that the programs as operated then were not proper under the WTO agreement. The U.S. appealed the ruling and the Appellate Body upheld the ruling in 2005. In August 2009, قرر محكمو منظمة التجارة العالمية أن البرازيل يمكن أن تفرض $830 مليون دولار سنويا في العقوبات ضد الولايات المتحدة. تجارة, including on intellectual property rights. The two countries have spent the last five years working out an arrangement to avoid the imposition of additional tariffs on products exported from the U.S. إلى البرازيل.

Brazils government first published a long list of U.S. البضائع التي قد تنتقم ضدها, including the potential cross-retaliation on intellectual property rights. The U.S. وأبرمت البرازيل ترتيب إطار مؤقت في 2010 بالنسبة للولايات المتحدة. لدفع معهد القطن البرازيلي $12.3 million per month for industry research and development until a new farm bill could be passed thatتعديل البرامج. Representatives of the two governments also met quarterly to discuss provisions that could be in the new farm bill. The farm bill was a year and a half late before being passed by Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture ran out of money to pay the Brazilians in September 2013, لكن إطار العمل ظل ساريًا وانتهت صلاحيته في فبراير 7, 2014, عندما 2014 تم سن قانون المزرعة.

لأن الولايات المتحدة. كان الطرف الخاسر في الأصل 2004 قرار, الولايات المتحدة. had the responsibility to seek a resolution of the dispute or face retaliation by Brazil as allowed by the WTO. The facts of the case were no longer an issue; both countries only needed to agree on a solution to the ruling. But the Brazilian government was far from united on how to respond. To no surprise, the cotton growers had pushed for retaliation. Brazils foreign ministry and the countrys large businesses urged caution. They thought that enacting protectionist measures would hurt Brazils sluggish economy. Supply lines are more likely today to cross international borders than in the past and increasing import tariffs would have hurt Brazilian manufacturers and consumers. One observer noted that the agreement decouples trade opportunities from policy disagreements when both sides in a dispute are major trading partners.

تحت التسوية, سوف يتلقى معهد القطن البرازيلي على الفور $300 مليون من الولايات المتحدة. and be allowed to use the money on an expanded list of activities. The U.S. لن يغير البرنامج الحالي للولايات المتحدة. منتجي القطن لحياة 2014 farm bill. The U.S. سيغير أيضا برنامج قروض تصدير السلع GSM-102 لتحديد طول القروض إلى 18 أشهر وربطها بأسعار الفائدة المعيارية التي وضعتها منظمة التعاون الاقتصادي والتنمية (منظمة التعاون الاقتصادي والتنمية) Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. Loans for 12 أشهر حتى 18 سيتم تقييم أشهر في 90 percent of the OECD rate risk adjusted by country by USDA. Loans of 18 سيتم تقييم الشهر في 95 في المئة من المعدل المعدل للمخاطر.

الولايات المتحدة. gets much in return. Brazil will drop its pending litigation at the World Trade Organization by October 22 والتخلي عن حقه في $830 million per year in retaliatory measures authorized by the WTO in 2009. Brazil agreed it will not launch new complaints (a peace clause) على برنامج دعم القطن الحالي طالما أن الولايات المتحدة الحالية. فاتورة المزرعة سارية المفعول (حتى سبتمبر 2018) والامريكى. يفي بشروط الاتفاقية الثنائية مع البرازيل. أيضا, لن تكون هناك شكاوى ضد ضمانات ائتمانات التصدير الزراعية في إطار برنامج GSM-102 إذا تم تشغيله بما يتفق مع الشروط المتفق عليها.

يبدو أن منتجي القطن البرازيلي الآن على استعداد للعيش مع STAX, برنامج تأمين المحاصيل لمنتجي القطن مع 80 الدعم في المئة من الحكومة الفيدرالية, even though it is still skeptical about the program’s impact on Brazilian producers and plans to monitor the effects. The Brazilian Cotton Association had earlier said their analysis indicated STAX would provide more subsidies than the previous programs.

ومن المقرر أن تستمر مذكرة التفاهم حتى سبتمبر. 30, 2018, باستثناء اثنين. The first is that the provisionson GSM-102 export loans will stay in place as long as the U.S. continues to operate the program in accordance with the MOU. The second is that the provisions outlining the uses of funds by the Brazil Cotton Institute will be enforced until projects are completed and no funds remain available for allocation by the institute.

غير الخلاف الذي استمر 12 عامًا الولايات المتحدة. policies for cotton and the export credit program. Cotton is no longer a farm program crop like corn, قمح, فول الصويا, rice and peanuts. Cotton producers cannot receive payments under the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) because cotton does not have a fixed reference price like the other crops. The length of commodity export loans has been cut from 36 أشهر ل 18 months. Interest rates are rated by the default risk of the country covered and a higher percentage of the total program costs are paid by the programs users.

الولايات المتحدة. cotton program will continue to be an issue, but less so, at the WTO. Exports have been about 75 percent of total uses of the U.S. crop recently compared to 60 في المئة في 2000-2002 و 28 percent of world trade recently compared to 38 percent in 2000-2002. U.S. domestic use declined with the ten-year phase out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement at the end of 2004. U.S. production has been 15.6 million bales annually on average in recent years compared to 18.2 million bales per year in 2000-2002. A bigger issue is that some of the poorer countries in the world are cotton producers who do not access to technology used by U.S., Brazilian and Chinese producers. Increased farm program spending by middle income developing countries (البرازيل, الهند & الصين) يحظى أيضًا باهتمام أكبر.

روس Korves هو محلل السياسات التجارية والاقتصادية مع الحقيقة حول تجارة &تقنية (http://www.truthabouttrade.org).Follow us: @TruthAboutTrade onتويتر|الحقيقة حول التجارة & Technology onموقع التواصل الاجتماعي الفيسبوك.